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OBSTACLES TO THE INTRODUCTION OF 
EFFICIENT MONEY INCENTIVES IN A 
HUNGARIAN FACTORY
LA JOS H ETH Y  and CSABA MAKO
A p r e v a i l i n g  belief in Hungarian so­ciety is that through the decentral­
ization scheme for the centrally planned 
economy introduced in 1968, most ob­
stacles to the growth of industrial effi­
ciency can be overcome, directly or in­
directly, by differential money incen­
tives. For the past three years a part of 
company profits has been used for dif­
ferential incentive bonuses: up to 80 
percent of salary for top management, 
50 percent for middle managers, and 
15 percent for wage earners. This con­
siderable share in profits has seemed to 
be a driving force for management; m an­
agers have made manifold attem pts to 
increase efficiency and profits in their 
companies. However, they usually have 
failed in their efforts to get workers to
W orker productivity  can no t be im proved 
simply by in troducing a system of m oney in ­
centives. Production  difficulties have th e ir o ri­
gins in the divergent interests and powers of 
various groups w ith in  the work establishm ent 
and require complex modifications of the social 
and economic environm ent for th e ir solution. 
T his study of a H ungarian  factory poin ts u p  
the need to identify the various groups of 
participants, the conditions under w hich they 
are m otivated to produce, and the processes by 
which m ultip le centers of interests and power 
develop. It concludes th a t resolution of socio­
economic conflicts is essential to achieving sat­
isfactory work perform ance.
Lajos H £thy and Casba Mak<J are m em bers 
of the Institu te  of Sociology, H ungarian  Acad­
emy of Sciences.— E d it o r
make a greater contribution to company 
objectives; obstacles to the growth of 
efficiency have continued to exist on the 
shop floor.
As a general rule, labor has rejected 
company goals; there has remained a 
constant gap between the targets set by 
management and the day-to-day perfor­
mance of employees. Lack of sympathy 
with managem ent’s objectives has been 
manifest in many ways: workers have 
resisted attempts to m aintain strict dis­
cipline, they have deliberately restricted 
output, they have performed work of 
poor quality, and so forth. Many m an­
agers and economic leaders believe that 
this discrepancy between company goals 
and labor’s behavior can be attributed 
to inadequacies in money incentives, that 
is, to the lack of fair wage differentials 
among workers.
O ur proposition is that the causal re­
lations are not so unambiguous and 
simple: inadequacies in wage incentives, 
although closely connected with difficul­
ties in the workshops, cannot be a basic 
cause of discipline problems and restric­
tion of output, bu t themselves are also 
a symptom. T he underlying cause of the 
difficulties, including the lack of fair 
wage differentials, lies in the structure 
of interests and powers within the or­
ganization and is based on certain micro
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and macro factors in the social and eco­
nomic environment. These factors origi­
nate from the present regulations set 
up by social and economic central agen­
cies and from the characteristics of the 
overall socioeconomic system of industry 
which has come into existence as a result 
of developments of the past few decades.
T o place our proposition in a sharper 
focus: production difficulties in work­
shops cannot be solved solely by revision 
of the incentive system. T he solution of 
these problems, including the introduc­
tion of efficient wage differentials, re­
quires complex changes in the structure 
of interests and power within the enter­
prise, that is, complex modifications in 
the social and economic environment.
The Company, Its Workers, and 
Shop-Floor Problems
O ur proposition is supported by the 
results of a sociological survey carried 
out in an engineering factory in western 
Hungary. T he company to be discussed 
plays an im portant role in the economic 
activity of the country. I t manufactures 
railway coaches, tank wagons, differential 
gears, axles, steering gears, and chassis 
for trucks and buses—mostly for export. 
It also has started production of heavy- 
duty Diesel engines under license from 
a West German firm. In  its different 
units the company employs a total of 
about fifteen thousand production work­
ers.
T he un it in which the survey took 
place manufactures bodies for railway 
coaches. Its employees, about two hun­
dred sheet-metal workers and welders, 
work in groups organized by the nature 
of their tasks. T he work groups are paid 
on the basis of how much they produce, 
according to a straight piece-rate system. 
As a group’s productivity increases, its 
earnings also rise; and conversely, as
output falls, there is a corresponding 
drop in earnings. W ithin the group, 
earnings are not divided equally bu t on 
the basis of the personal wage rates of 
the members. T he wage plan thus is de­
signed to function as a group incentive 
and as an individual incentive at the 
same time. T he activities of the groups 
are directed by nine foremen and two 
senior foremen.
T he management of the company was 
not satisfied with discipline and work 
intensity in the railway coach unit, as 
individual workers and even groups 
often restricted ou tput and had high 
turnover rates, thus endangering the 
continuity of production. For this rea­
son, management revised the wage plan 
in 1968. T he revision was based on a 
widespread belief that setting proper 
wage differentials would provide the 
solution to production problems.1
T he wage plan, as a group incentive, 
seemed to be satisfactory. As an indi­
vidual incentive, however, it  seemed to 
be unresponsive to management’s efforts 
to enlarge the quantity of output. Per­
sonal wage rates, which regulated the 
relations of individual earnings within 
the group, had been set according to a 
central service and merit-rating system. 
T he favorite factors of the system, length 
of service in the company and profes­
sional qualification, were irrelevant to 
individual output, since neither long ex­
perience nor high-skill qualification were 
needed in the highly roudnized work in 
the plant. Thus, the system of personal 
wage rates had two m ajor deficiencies: 
(1) wages did not properly reflect indi­
JA system of differential incentive bonuses 
was in troduced in  H ungary in 1968 as a na ­
tional scheme. I t  was pa rt of a series of eco­
nomic reform s in tended to produce a decentral­
ized and m ore flexible industria l structure, w ith 
increased em phasis on m arket requirem ents and 
efficiency.
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vidual effort and yielded different earn­
ings to workers of equal performance; 
and (2) the scale of individual wage 
differentials, originating from the rates, 
did not reflect possible differences in 
individual output, because it was too 
narrow.
T o  correct these inadequacies, m an­
agement abolished the central service 
and merit-rating system and authorized 
the foremen and the work groups, as 
the persons having the most accurate 
information about the efforts of indi­
viduals, to set new personal wage rates. 
T he new rates set by the foremen and 
workers were, however, even less respon­
sive to management’s objectives than the 
previous ones. Individual wage inequi­
ties continued to exist, and the range 
of individual wage differentials became 
even narrower.2
In the course of our survey, we ex­
amined the empirical and logical con­
nections among the level and scale of 
individual wage differentials approved 
by the employees, the structure of inter­
ests and powers within the organization, 
and the socioeconomic environment. 
O ur survey endeavored to cover all the 
im portant factors motivating the be­
havior of workers and foremen. T he in­
formation needed came from th re e  
sources: (1) structured interviews with 
each worker in the unit, with the help 
of a substantial questionnaire; (2) un ­
structured interviews with the majority 
of workers, with the foremen, and with 
representatives of top management; and 
(3) data in the records of the company.
Need for Labor-Management 
Cooperation
T he long-run economic success of a 
business organization requires coopera­
2T h e  coefficient of variation of the original 
scale was 0.13, th a t of the  revised scale 0.10.
tion between the two m ajor participants 
in production, managers and workers, 
and the formation of company goals ac­
ceptable to both. Cooperation and work­
ing out common goals can be based only 
on the solution of conflict situations pro­
duced by divergencies in the interests of 
management and labor and on the ex­
istence of compromise situations, in 
which the two m ajor participants have 
a relatively good bargain in comparison 
with their contributions to the success 
of the organization. Compromise, how­
ever, does not develop automatically 
from conflicts; a certain balance of pow­
er and influence is necessary between 
management and labor to advance the 
process.
In the case of the company examined, 
cooperation between managers and work­
ers was not satisfactory. T he employees 
rejected the goals which the employers 
had prescribed for them. Conflict situa­
tions seemed to be lasting, and the 
equilibrium  of opposing powers ap­
peared to be upset.
On the assumption that the structure 
of interests and powers is determined 
by the social and economic environment, 
we examined all factors which might 
have a direct or indirect effect on the 
interests, goals, influence, and behavior 
of people within the framework of the 
organization. As the company is part 
of a centrally planned economy, we paid 
special attention to regulations by the 
central agencies.
Divergence in Management and 
Worker Goals
T he clashes between the interests of 
management and labor focused on wages 
and output. Management, stimulated by 
its considerable share in profits, using 
prices in the international market as a 
guide, tried to choose a profit-maximiz­
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ing bundle in its production-possibility 
set. (Plant managers have had remark­
able freedom in such decisions since the 
introduction of decentralization in 1968.) 
T he decision was made to withdraw from 
manufacture of railway coaches and un ­
dertake production of heavy-duty Diesel 
engines for buses and trucks. T he com­
pany’s antiquated technology for railway 
coach manufacture made the operation 
unprofitable, and state subsidies were 
being withdrawn. In addition, demand 
for coaches is limited and several other 
companies produce them under more 
favorable circumstances. However, im­
mediate cessation of production was not 
possible; withdrawal was to take the 
form of a gradual reduction of produc­
tion. Accordingly, management felt that 
cuts in production costs were necessary. 
Since investment in new equipm ent or 
processes was not indicated under the 
circumstances, management decided to 
cut labor costs by decreasing wages per 
un it of output.
Labor, as its share in profits was low, 
was motivated by wages. Workers were 
ready to make extra efforts for extra 
pay and aimed their activities at maxi­
mizing earnings. T he employees in the 
workshops, mostly of agricultural origin, 
were hard-working people, in whose 
thinking wages were fundam ental in re­
lation to their families’ living standards 
and also as a measure of their im­
portance in relation to others in and 
out of the factory. T h e  workers, conse­
quently, opposed the managers’ goals, 
regarding them as directed at “sweating” 
labor simply to “fill the company cof­
fers.”
Central Wage Regulations
Responsibility for the divergence of 
management and labor interests cannot 
be fixed, however, entirely on the profit-
sharing system, on the high level of pro­
duction costs, on backward technology, 
or on the withdrawal of governmental 
subsidies. A prom inent part was played 
in the continuing confrontation by the 
control of central agencies over the level 
of wages. T he central regulations pegged 
wages per capita on a roughly equal 
level in all engineering companies owned 
by the state. Any increase had to be 
covered from the share of profits to be 
divided among the participants in pro­
duction, a sum that was considerable in 
relation to the salaries of managers but 
extremely small in relation to the total 
am ount of wages of employees. Thus 
the management made attempts to cut 
wages per un it of ou tput and at the 
same time to keep wages per capita un­
changed; it required extra effort from its 
employees without being willing or, in 
fact, capable of giving them extra re­
ward.3
Only on the basis of the conditions 
of the company and the specified rules 
the management was obligated to follow, 
can we understand the contradictory 
features of its incentive policies. M an­
agement pressed the work groups for in­
creased production and, to this end, em­
ployed an efficient group incentive, a 
piece-rate system w ithout (at least, theo­
retically) any ceiling on earnings. It 
promised extra reward for extra output. 
Moreover, as we have noted, manage­
ment also made attempts to improve in­
3T h e  control of central agencies over wages 
was in tended to avoid certain  undesirable ef­
fects of the economic reform . T o ta l freedom of 
m anagers, m otivated by their share in profits, 
to regulate wages m ight have led to rapidly 
growing earnings for some workers, while caus­
ing unem ploym ent for others, a n d /o r  to  a high 
rate of inflation and  disequilibrium  of supply 
and dem and in the m arket for consum er goods. 
Such a process w ould have been followed by 
sharp  and open social conflicts instead of the 
concealed ones described in this article.
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Table 7. Worker Evaluation of Possibilities Offered by Work for Self-Improvement 
and Self-Expression Compared to Worker Desires.
Learning 
New Things
Using One’s 
Own Ideas
Doing 
Interesting Tasks
Making Use of 
One's Professional 
Knowledge
A ctual situation 1.40 1.70 1.58 1.95
Desired situation 2.50 2.39 2.90 2.74
G ap - 1 .1 0 - 0 .6 9 - 1 .3 2 - 0 .7 9
T h e  indexes represent the averages of evaluations given by ab o u t two hun d red  workers. A score of 
3.0 m eans a high possibility, while a  score of 1.0 m eans no possibility.
dividual incentives by revising the ser­
vice and merit-rating system. But when 
work-group productivity and earnings 
rose appreciably, it arbitrarily reset 
piece rates, also cutting wages per capita 
and pegging them to the level perm itted 
by the central agencies. In 1969, piece 
rates were cut twice, resulting in a 20 
percent loss for labor in wages.4
Worker Perceptions of Their Jobs
Labor-management conflicts over the 
level of wages were of the utmost gravity, 
as wages held a top place in each work­
er’s evaluation of his job. Workers told 
us: “We do not come here to produce 
railway carriages, bu t to earn a living.” 
T he reasons for the money-centered at­
titude of labor can be found partly in 
the present level of living in the country 
and partly in aspects of the environment 
which hinder the satisfaction of higher-
4T h e  regulations of the central agencies do 
not necessarily call in to  existence such m an ­
agem ent policies. In  several engineering com­
panies, poor standards, poor scheduling of jobs, 
insufficiencies in  the supply of m aterial and  in 
the m aintenance of tools autom atically  prevent 
m anagem ent from  bu ild ing  u p  workable incen­
tive systems. M anagem ents in  o th er firms, en ­
joying large subsidies and favorable in te rnal 
m arket conditions set by the central agencies, 
naturally  refrain from pushing workers to in ­
creased effort. In  all these cases, a tacit agree­
m ent is forced on labor by m anagem ent; m an ­
agem ent does not offer extra  pay and does no t 
require extra  work either.
level needs of individuals within the fac­
tory. W orking people were frustrated 
by the monotony of their routinized 
jobs, by their inability to advance pro­
fessionally, by the pressures to which 
they were subject as they tried to do 
work of quality instead of quantity, and 
by their inability to achieve a measure 
of respect and autonomy in their every­
day activities.
Table 1 presents a summary of worker 
responses to a questionnaire asking them 
to indicate the extent to which they felt 
the actual work situation offered possi­
bilities for self-improvement and self- 
expression. If a worker felt his job 
offered very good opportunity for learn­
ing new ideas or skills, his response was 
scaled at 3.0. If he felt it offered no 
possibility for learning new things, his 
response was marked 1.0. T he “desired 
situation” represents the aspirations of 
the respondents, that is, the extent to 
which they would like to have oppor­
tunities for learning, using their own 
ideas, doing interesting tasks, or using 
their professional knowledge.
T he workers had practically no chance 
for promotion to the positions of fore­
man and senior foreman, posts usually 
w ithin the limits of workers’ career struc­
ture. On the one hand, in the un it to 
be shut down the num ber of such posi­
tions gradually was decreasing; on the
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Table 2. Workers’ Evaluation of Role Actually Played in Promotion by Various Factors 
as Compared to Their Perceptions of Desirable Role.
Individual
Performance
Company
Service
Professional
Knowledge
Approval 
by Fellow 
Workers
Friends 
in Top 
Management
Social /Trade 
Union and 
Party/ 
Functions
A ctual situation 1.88 2.01 2.13 1.39 2.11 2.13
D esirable situation 2.34 2.28 2.50 2.32 1.07 1.31
G ap - 0 .4 6 - 0 .2 7 - 0 .3 7 - 0 .9 3 + 1 .0 4 + 0 .82
T h e  indexes represent the averages of evaluations given by ab o u t two hundred  workers. A score of 3.0 
m eans a  significant role, while 1.0 m eans an  insignificant one.
other hand, promotion in the company 
was based in large part on factors un­
related to skill or experience such as 
informal links to management, party 
membership, and trade union activities. 
W orkers’ perceptions of the role played 
in promotion by various factors as com­
pared to the importance they felt should 
be given these factors are presented in 
T able 2. Because of lack of satisfaction 
of their higher-level needs, w o rk e rs  
sought compensation in money.
Role of the Union
T he series of management victories 
and labor defeats, good bargains on one 
side and poor bargains on the other, 
resulted in a lasting confrontation, the 
existence of which reflected a lack of 
equilibrium  in power, an imbalance of 
opposing forces at the company. T he 
management wielded an overwhelming 
power which the trade union, destined 
to defend the interests of labor, was in­
capable or unwilling to counterbalance. 
Incentive policies at the company, in­
cluding the continual cuts in piece rates, 
were approved by the executive of the 
trade union. T he union, a heritage of a 
previous period, united in its ranks all 
sorts of members of the business organi­
zation, from unskilled workers to top 
managers. Several trade union positions
were occupied by foremen, middle m an­
agers, and even top managers. T he 
union’s executive had a considerable 
share in company profits. In fact, top 
union leaders and top company m an­
agers, despite occasional spectacular con­
frontations, seemed to the workers to be 
a monolithic group.
Although labor’s rights to take part 
in company affairs, including decisions 
about the wage plan and promotion, 
were guaranteed, workers had no means 
to im plement them. T he functioning of 
the institution of workers’ direct partici­
pation in management decisions relevant 
to their interests proved to be profoundly 
formal. T he dom inant push from labor 
might have come through the informal 
organization of workers, which some­
times had substantial powers rival to 
those of management, but in most cases 
this informal organization was weak.
It has been suggested that the core 
conflict is between management and la­
bor and arises from certain micro and 
macro economic and social factors, cre­
ated by the present regulations of the 
central agencies and by the realities of 
the socioeconomic progress of past dec­
ades. On the assumption, however, that 
people generally act under the influence 
of their environment, it seems obvious 
that neither company managers nor fac­
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tory workers are homogeneous social 
units. Both are divided into several strata 
representing divergent in te r e s t s  a n d  
goals. Thus the next step of our study 
was to scrutinize the intramanagement 
and intralabor structures of interests and 
powers, which affect harmony within the 
company.
The Structure of Management
W ithin management, the foremen and 
other lower-level supervisors formed a 
separate stratum, with objectives often 
contradicting the interests of top m an­
agers. These “men in the middle” had 
substantial power to influence the pro­
duction and wages of work groups. T he 
functional departments of management 
were incapable of controlling production 
problems, including supply of m aterial 
and maintenance, and their solution was 
up to the foremen. (This situation 
originated in the primitive level of tech­
nology, characteristic of the small fac­
tories of the past.) But top managers, 
believing in the efficiency of centraliza­
tion within the company, did not take 
into consideration the influence of the 
foremen. Accordingly, nothing had been 
done to insure their cooperation. Fore­
men received salaries inferior to those 
of the best-paid workers, and this state 
of affairs remained unchanged regard­
less of their special efforts or negligence. 
As a result, management policies were a 
m atter of indifference to foremen. They 
neither aided nor hindered the success 
of management’s attempts to encourage 
work group and individual output but 
restricted their activities to the perfor­
mance of routine tasks. T heir substantial 
powers remained largely potential, and 
their role in the discussions between 
top management and labor was of m inor 
importance.
Separate Strata in Labor
Labor was also divided into separate 
strata. Each worker considered manage­
m ent’s incentive policies hostile to his 
interests and protested efforts to cut la­
bor costs. Workers’ devotion to money 
was general. However, personal wage 
rates, seniority with the organization, 
professional skills, household expenses, 
structure of consumption, traditions, and 
other factors produced a compartmental- 
ization within the labor group similar to 
that which occurred at management 
level. T here were two m ajor factors re­
sponsible for the division of workers in ­
to strata with divergent interests and 
various powers.
1. T he current level and the future 
prospect of the individual’s earnings, 
that is, his actual and expected economic 
position in the organization. Both were 
dependent on wages per capita in the 
work group to which the individual be­
longed and on his personal wage rate. 
As wages per capita were pegged by the 
company on roughly the same level in 
all the groups, differences in the actual 
and expected economic positions could 
be caused only by personal wage rates. 
These rates, set prim arily on the basis 
of length of service in the company or 
job experience, moved rapidly upward 
until age thirty and then stopped. As a 
result, workers above thirty years of age 
earned a relatively good living, while 
their fellow workers below thirty were 
doing rather poorly. But the reverse of 
the medal was that workers over thirty- 
years old had no prospects of further 
wage increases, and management policies 
put them in a hopelessly deteriorating 
position, while younger workers enjoyed 
rapidly growing wages and, in this way, 
were partly compensated for losses caused 
by piece-rate cuts.
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2. T he style of living of the worker 
and his family. This factor is closely con­
nected with the previous one, as the 
main source of a worker’s income is his 
earnings. People over thirty-years old 
usually had a well-balanced household 
budget. They generally had their own 
homes, well-furnished and mechanized. 
They had ended debts connected with 
building or purchasing their homes and 
had acquired durable goods such as tele­
vision sets, refrigerators, washing m a­
chines, and motorcycles. T o  the earnings 
of the head of the family, the earnings 
of the wife were added. She also might 
have a job as their children had reached 
school age. Workers below thirty years, 
on the other hand, carried the burdens 
of fundam ental investments connected 
with the establishment of family life. 
They were indebted to the savings bank 
for money to build  or buy a house and 
to furnish it. Moreover, as their children 
were small, their wives usually could not 
take a job. (In the differences of the 
economic positions of families, a domi­
nant role was played by the housing 
shortage in the country, which exerted 
a strong pressure on household budgets 
for several years in the worker’s life.)
On the basis of these and other eco­
nomic factors, workers were divided in­
to two m ajor strata with divergent 
interests and various powers. T he age 
of thirty seemed to be the economic (not 
demographic) dividing line.
Different Attitudes 
Toward Performance
Workers above thirty years of age 
vigorously resisted managem ent’s efforts 
to secure maximization of production by 
the work group. Instead, they were in 
favor of the optimization of group out­
put. Optimization m eant te m p o ra ry  
maximization to exploit the upward
trend of production and wages stimu­
lated by management, followed by a 
temporary slowdown to avoid piece-rate 
cuts so as to avoid jeopardizing earnings. 
T heir objective represented a form of 
rational accommodation to the contra­
dictory features of management’s incen­
tive policy and also was based on con­
sideration of the state of their house­
hold budgets. Slowdowns and the ac­
companying drops in earnings connected 
with optimization were made possible 
by the flexible needs of these older work­
ers for money, by their relatively high 
earnings within the organization, and by 
the sound economic position of their 
families.
Because workers under thirty years, 
on the other hand, had no alternatives 
to choose among, they acted almost en­
tirely under the economic pressure of 
their positions. T heir needs for money 
were inflexible as a result of their rela­
tively low individual earnings and the 
expenses of their household budgets. 
T hough reluctantly, they met manage­
m ent’s demands to maximize work-group 
performance. They aimed their activities 
at extracting the most possible money 
from the company, regardless of the con­
sequences.
T he power of the two strata of labor, 
clashing within the framework of the 
group, was not equal. T he older workers 
(over thirty years) had built up an ex­
tended inform al organization and occu­
pied nearly all formal positions of power 
in many work groups. T he existence of 
their informal organization, based on 
the compromise of fairly flexible indi­
vidual interests, originated from the 
members’ being cornered by manage­
m ent and, in a sense, by younger work­
ers as well. People under thirty years 
usually had less power and were subject 
to greater pressures from their family
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Table 3. Work Groups Classified by Behavior and Attitudes Concerning Performance
and Personal Wage Differentials.
Type of Group Number of Groups
Behavior in 
Job Performance
Wage Differentials Approved by Group 
Level Index *
I 10 O ptim ization M edium .09
II 5 M axim ization H igh .13
I I I 4 M axim ization V ery low .01
*Coefficient of variation.
Table 4. Socioeconomic Backgrounds of Work Group Members.
Percentage of Each Type
Above Company Average
Type of Group Age Skilled Service Over Family Own Personal
Thirty Ten Tears Heads Home Wage Rate
forints
I 65.1 80.3 53.0 77.7 60.8 8.35
II 32.8 78.2 25.2 51.5 32.8 7.85
I I I 84.3 50.5 41.1 73.7 78.9 8.23
positions and forces within the factory. 
The pattern of conflicting interests and 
powers within labor, which the m an­
agers tried successfully to exploit on the 
principle of divide et impera, had an 
effect also on the sharpness of the over­
all confrontation between employers 
and employees. Labor, torn by internal 
clashes, was unable in most cases to 
build efficient resistance against manage­
ment, and that made a considerable con­
tribution to the permanence of chronic 
disagreement.
Patterns in Behavior of Work Groups
Work groups showed significant dif­
ferences in attitudes and behavior con­
cerning performance and personal wage 
differentials. They could be classified in 
this respect into three types, as is done 
in Table 3.
Work groups belonging to the three 
types differed in skill, length of service 
with the company, family status, and 
other socioeconomic characteristics, as
indicated in T able 4. All included work­
ers in the older and younger age groups 
but in different proportions.
Type I Groups
T he great majority of members of 
groups in Type I were older workers 
(over thirty years), while younger per­
sons were in the minority. T he older 
workers joined together to build a pow­
erful informal organization, including 
70 percent of group membership. They 
seized all possible sources of formal 
power, occupying the positions of group 
leaders and trade union functionaries. 
There were also several Communist 
party members among them.
T he informal organization served as 
an agency through which members ob­
tained and evaluated information about 
their environment. I t  worked out norma­
tive rules for collective activity in order 
to control the aspects of economic and 
social environment which were of con­
sequence to individual members. It func­
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tioned as a defense, endeavoring to pro­
tect its members and to extract the most 
possible for them from their common 
enemy. It carried out the policy of op­
timization of work-group productivity, 
combating deterioration of the economic 
positions of workers and keeping their 
wages, in comparison with their efforts, 
at a maximum.
Younger workers (those below thirty 
years) were isolated individuals, outside 
the framework of the informal organi­
zation. They were forced, by the substan­
tial power of the older people, to agree 
to optimization of output. Although it 
did not always suit their interests be­
cause of their inflexible and pressing 
needs for money, they could perceive its 
advantages and worked in r e la t iv e ly  
peaceful coexistence with the others.
T he members of the informal organi­
zation, although a decrease in individual 
wage differences contradicted their im­
mediate interests, set personal wage rate 
differentials on a medium level (.09 in­
dex). In this way they made a concession 
to the younger workers to insure better 
cooperation within the work group 
against management. Groups in Type I, 
due to their highly developed central­
ized informal organization, were capable 
of counterbalancing, to a remarkable ex­
tent, the power of the management. 
Sometimes they successfully underm ined 
management attempts directed against 
them, other times they suffered defeats; 
but they never capitulated. As the result, 
they usually lived in a peaceful atmos­
phere in the organization. Some groups, 
owing to their extraordinary cohesive­
ness and to their monopolistic position 
in the process of production, even m an­
aged to attain very high average earn­
ings, far above the level pegged by the 
company.
Type II Groups
T he membership of work groups of 
Type II was made up of a majority 
of younger workers and a small minority 
of older people. Informal organization 
was weak and divided into opposing 
units, as both the older and younger 
workers created their own informal bonds 
of solidarity to protect their interests. At 
the same time, the means of formal 
power also were divided between the two 
strata: both occupied group-leader, trade- 
union-functionary, and Communist-par- 
ty positions. Older workers, however, as 
they were in a m inority and their powers 
proved to be weak, were forced to give 
up their original objectives and surren­
der to the maximization of output urged 
by their younger fellow workers and by 
management. T his capitulation resulted 
in a perm anent deterioration of their 
position, caused by continual piece-rate 
cuts. Thus, confrontation in a rather 
sharp form became lasting within the 
groups in Type II.
T he high-level individual wage dif­
ferentials (.13 index) can be explained 
on the basis of these intragroup clashes. 
Workers over thirty-years old were un­
willing to concede to the younger people 
on wage differentials, as cooperation 
against management was not possible. 
They were fighting, in this case with 
considerable success, to preserve a high 
level of personal wage-rate differentials 
favorable to them. T he work groups, 
torn by internal struggles, could not 
counterbalance the power of manage­
ment. T he older workers, brought to bay 
by their cohorts, suffered painful defeats 
from continual piece-rate cuts, while 
younger people—though somewhat com­
pensated by the growth of their personal 
wage rates—also were hurt.
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Type III Groups
The members of work groups in Type 
III belonged to the strata of older work­
ers, whose best interests, under the cir­
cumstances of the company, required the 
optimization of output. This form of 
self-defense was made impossible, how­
ever, by certain factors in the physical 
and economic environment not previous­
ly mentioned. T he simple preparatory 
operations in the un it were performed 
by these groups, while workers in the 
other groups were engaged in the more 
complicated building of the railway car­
riage’s body. T he existence of a group 
incentive in Types I and II was justified 
by the collective nature of work, while 
in the Type III  groups it was introduced 
to simplify administration. T he workers, 
only a few in number, performed their 
tasks separated from each other in the 
different corners of the shop and in 
shifts. T he nature of work and the lack 
of permanent collective activities kept 
members from forming the strong in ­
formal bonds which were essential for the 
optimization of output. Furtherm ore, 
wages per capita, on a roughly equal level 
in all the other groups, here were kept 
very low by management as a result of 
the simple individual tasks. U nder the 
pressure of these circumstances, the only 
choice for the Type III  groups was the 
maximization of productivity. Over time, 
these workers were forced to make an 
increasing contribution to company ob­
jectives for nearly the same am ount of 
money. As a primitive form of defense, 
they decreased differences in personal 
wage rates to a m inim um  (.01 index).
T he various types of work-group be­
havior in performance and in setting 
wage differentials were thus derived from 
the structure of interests and powers 
within the work force (intralabor rela­
tions) and within the company (labor- 
m anagement relations), based on the 
whole of the socioeconomic environment. 
T h e  various types of w orkgroup be­
havior resulted in different outcomes: 
some work groups managed to reach ex­
ceptionally high wages beyond any limits 
set by the company or by the central 
agencies; others fared poorly. Some work 
groups carried out their activities at a 
comfortable pace, others struggled un­
der the pressure of tight piece rates.
T he findings of this examination of 
work-group behavior and intralabor and 
labor-management relations are sum­
marized in T able 5.
Conclusions
T he findings of this study seem to 
support rather convincingly the proposi­
tion initially proposed: difficulties on the 
shop floor, including the inadequacies 
of the incentive system, have their basic 
cause in the structure of divergent in­
terests and various powers within the 
company. T he decrease in individual 
wage differentials carried out by labor in 
opposition to m anagement’s goals, the 
occasional deliberate slowdown of pro­
duction by a significant num ber of work 
groups and the high mobility of m an­
power, all are symptoms of labor-manage- 
m ent and intralabor conflict situations 
and of a disequilibrium  of power. In this 
respect, the indexes of mobility are worth 
noting. In  Type I work groups, where 
tension was relatively low due to the 
considerable power of the workers, only 
21 percent of members left the company 
during one and one-half years. In  Types 
II and III, where confrontation was espe­
cially sharp owing to the defenseless sit­
uation of certain strata, about 60 percent 
of workers gave warning to the firm in 
the same period.
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Table 5. Piece Rates, Intralabor Relations, and Labor-Management Relations
by Types of Groups.
I
Type of Group 
I I I I I
Level of piece rates loose or norm al norm al o r tight very tight
In tra lab o r relations:
S tructure  of interests w orkable comprom ise 
betw een two stra ta
chronic conflicts 
betw een two stra ta
no definite structure
S tructure  of power central, powerful 
inform al organization
divided, weak 
inform al organization
only casual inform al 
bonds am ong m em bers
L abor-m anagem ent relations:
S tructure  of interests low level of conflicts high level of conflicts high level of conflicts
S tructure  of power relative equilibrium  
of power
perm anen t disequi­
lib rium  of power
com plete defenseless­
ness of workers
T he structure of powers played an 
especially im portant role. T he lack of 
proper division of the means of power 
among the participants in production 
produced very serious consequences. It 
also seemed that not only was the di­
vision of power imperfect, but also the 
total am ount of power at the disposal 
of the organization was insufficient. T he 
company seemed to be too tied by cen­
tral regulations to be capable of finding 
satisfactory solutions for its pressing 
problems. T he constructive participa­
tion of labor scarcely can be anticipated, 
if management itself does not have 
enough freedom in making vital deci­
sions (for example, concerning the level 
of wages).
As the structure of interests and pow­
ers is determined basically by the socio­
economic environment, the difficulties in 
the workshops can be overcome only by 
coordinated fundam ental modifications 
in the complex of micro and macro so­
cioeconomic factors. T he prevailing be­
lief in H ungarian society that problems 
regarding the attitude of labor can be 
solved by the revision of incentive plans
and the introduction of fair-wage differ­
entials, that is, by change in a single 
microeconomic factor, is p r o f o u n d l y  
naive, as proved by the example of the 
company studied. T he m ajor factors in­
fluencing the course of events within 
the factory are the following:
1. Macro (that is, national) measures 
include the regulations of the central 
agencies of the economy, such as the 
profit-sharing system, the control over 
wages per capita, the practice of setting 
prices for the internal market and of 
giving subsidies to business organiza­
tions, the system of credits for company 
investments, in brief, the decentraliza­
tion scheme of the centrally planned 
economy introduced in 1968. One also 
can include here regulations directly 
affecting labor: the central measures
directed at the welfare of the population 
(the social insurance system, the housing 
program, the policy of taxation, and so 
forth). Rules outlining the organization 
and functioning of social institutions 
like trade unions also should be men­
tioned. T he central regulations are based 
on scientific analysis of the economic and
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social realities of the past several decades 
and include complicated social, hum ani­
tarian, and political preferences. T h at 
is why their change, although required 
by a num ber of negative side effects, 
cannot be a rapid process.
2. Micro (company) measures include 
management incentive policies (the over­
all wage plan, the system of personal 
wage rates, incentives for foremen and 
other middle managers, the m ethod of 
piece rate setting, and so forth), promo­
tion policies, the functioning of trade 
union and other social organizations, 
the decentralization of internal decisions, 
the construction of institutions for la­
bor’s participation, the existence and sta­
bility of informal organization, the social 
composition and stratification of work­
ers, the effects of their out-of-factory en­
vironments and traditions, and so forth.
Although all these micro factors are 
closely connected with the macro ones, 
certain improvement in the solution of 
conflict situations can be achieved even 
by their revision within the limits of the 
company’s possibilities, if the modifica­
tions are based on careful consideration.
T he following forward step, however, 
requires the contribution of social sci­
ence. Much more emphasis should be 
placed on defining the main groups of 
participants and the conditions under 
which they are motivated to participate 
and to produce, on the processes by 
which m ultiple centers of power and in­
fluence develop, and on conflict resolu­
tion as a subject which is im portant not 
only in labor-management relations but 
also in most other intergroup relations 
within the firm as well.
